Abstract. This paper describes new methods in pairing-based signature schemes for identifying the invalid digital signatures in a batch, after batch verification has failed. These methods efficiently identify non-trivial numbers of invalid signatures in batches of (potentially large) numbers of signatures. Our methods use "divide-and-conquer" search to identify the invalid signatures within a batch, but prune the search tree to substantially reduce the number of pairing computations required. The methods presented in this paper require computing on average O(w) products of pairings to identify w invalid signatures within a batch of size N , compared with the O(w(log 2 (N/w)+1)) [for w < N/2] that traditional divide-and-conquer methods require. Our methods avoid the problem of exponential growth in expected computational cost that affect earlier proposals which, on average, require computing O(w) products of pairings. We compare the expected performance of our batch verification methods with previously published divide-and-conquer and exponential cost methods for Cha-Cheon identity-based signatures [6] . However, our methods also apply to a number of short signature schemes and as well as to other identity-based signature schemes.
Introduction
Public-key digital signatures have frequently been used in proposals for securing wireless network protocols. Proposals include methods for performing the following: combating SPAM [11] ; securing routing protocols [19, 30] ; providing secure accounting and charging for use of the wireless network, or securely giving incentives to nodes for desirable (to the network) behavior [22, 4] ; protecting location and safety messages in vehicular networks [23, 21] ; and securely transporting ordinary messages in delay (or disruption) tolerant networks [7, 26] . Even in wireless networks that have significant performance constraints such as sensor networks, it has been argued on efficiency grounds that signature schemes should be used for message authentication rather than symmetric cryptographic techniques [10, 27] .
When protocol designers need to select a bandwidth efficient signature scheme, they will be drawn to schemes based on bilinear pairings, such as the short signature schemes [2, 5] or the bandwidth efficient identity-based signature schemes [6, 5] . However, the computational cost of such schemes, especially the cost of their verification algorithms, can negatively impact the performance of wireless networks (e.g., increased delay, CPU utilization, energy consumption). Therefore, whenever circumstances allow, designers will employ batch verification methods for such pairing-based signature schemes [29, 5, 14] . Adversaries can attempt to negate the advantages of batch verification by corrupting messages or signatures within a batch. To counter such attacks, efficient methods are needed to identify the valid signatures within a batch that has failed initial batch verification.
To discover the valid signatures in an invalid batch, rather than verifying each signature individually, "divide-and-conquer" (DQ) techniques have been proposed [20, 14] . These methods can be significantly faster than verifying individually whenever the ratio of the number of invalid signatures to the batch size is low. These methods require only O(w(log 2 (N/w) + 1)) batch verifications and, for pairing-based signatures, product of pairings computations [13] . Recent methods for identification of invalid pairing-based signatures require O(w) batch verifications [14] . When the ratio w/N is very low these methods can provide significant performance improvements over DQ methods; however, the cost of performing the batch verifications used in these methods grows exponentially, limiting their use to very small batches, and to batches with only very few invalid signatures.
Our contribution. In this paper, we present two new methods for finding invalid signatures in pairing-based schemes. These methods are based on divide-and-conquer searching, but differ from previous methods in how the (sub-)batches are verified. The average number of product of pairings computations required in our methods is O(w), which is a substantial improvement over previous divide-and-conquer methods when the ratio w/N is low, and is the same complexity as the exponential cost methods. The expected number of multiplications in 2 /(w − 1)!) [14] . We have specified these methods and compared their performance for Cha-Cheon signatures [6] ; however, these methods can be applied to several other pairing-based signature schemes, specifically the batched identity-based and batched short signature schemes discussed in [8] .
Notation
In this paper we assume that pairing-based schemes use bilinear pairings on an elliptic curve E, defined over F q , where q is a large prime. G 1 and G 2 are distinct subgroups of prime order r on this curve, where G 1 is a subset of the points on E with coordinates in F q , and G 2 is a subset of the points on E with coordinates in F q d , for a small integer d (the embedding degree).
The pairing e is a map from G 1 × G 2 into G T where G T is a multiplicative group of order r in the field F q d .
We use the following notation for the components of the costs of (batch) signature verification and invalid signature identification methods for Cha-Cheon signatures. CstDblPair is the cost of a double product of pairings computation [13] . CstMultG 1 (t 1 ) is the cost of multiplying an element of G 1 by a scalar s of size |s| and t 1 = log 2 (|s|) ; likewise CstDlbMultG 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) is the cost of a pair of multiplications of elements of G 1 by scalars of size t 1 and t 2 simultaneously. CstAddG 1 is the cost of adding two elements of G 1 , and CstSubG 1 is the cost of subtracting an element of G 1 from another element. CstInvG T is the cost of computing an inverse of an element in G T ; CstMultG T is the cost of multiplying two elements of G T ; and CstExptG T (t 1 ) is the cost of raising an element of G T to the power s.
Background
Batch cryptography was introduced by Fiat [9] , and the first batch signature scheme was that of Naccache et al. [18] for a variant of DSA signatures. Bellare et al. [1] presented three generic methods for batching modular exponentiations: the random subset test, the small exponents test (SET), and the bucket test, which are related to techniques in [18, 28] .
The inputs to the small exponents test are a security parameter l, a generator g of the group G of prime order q, and (
y i r i ; and 4) tests whether g x = y and accepts the batch if true, else rejects. If the test rejects a batch, then there is at least one invalid pair (x i , y i ); the probability that the test accepts a batch containing invalid signatures is at most 2 −l [1] , if the order of G is a prime [3] . One of the r's can be set to one without loss of security [14] . The small exponents test has appeared in pairing-based signature schemes [2, 5] including, in [14] , as the batch verifier for the Cha-Cheon signature scheme [6] . 1 Cha-Cheon identity-based signature scheme. H(m, U ) is a cryptographic hash that maps a bit string m and a point U ∈ G 1 to an integer between 1 and r.
Setup:
The system manager selects an order r point T ∈ G 2 and randomly selects an integer s in the range [1, r − 1]. The manager computes S = sT . The public system parameters are T and S. The system manager's secret key is s. 2. Extract: Each user is given a key pair. The user's public key, Q, is a point in G 1 that is derived from the user's identity using a public algorithm. The user's private key is C = sQ. 3. Sign: To sign a message m, the signer randomly generates an integer t in the range [1, r − 1] and outputs a signature (U, V ) where U = tQ and V = (t + H(m, U ))C 4. Verify: To verify a signature (U, V ) of message m, the verifier derives the signer's public key Q from the alleged signer's identity and computes h = H(m, U ). If e(U + hQ, S) = e(V, T ) then the signature is accepted. Otherwise, the signature is rejected. This test can be rewritten as 1 = e(U + hQ, S) · e(V, −T ) which can be computed more efficiently [13] .
In [14] the following batch verifier was presented. The verifier obtains N messages m i , for i = 1 to N , and the signatures (U i , V i ) and signer's identity for each message. The verifier derives each public key Q i from the signer's identity and checks that U i and V i are elements of G 1 .
The verifier sets r 1 = 1 and generates random values r i from [0, 2 l − 1], for i = 2 to N . The batch is valid if
, and 1 is the identity in F q d .
Identifying Invalid Signatures
The problem of identifying invalid signatures within a batch has only recently been investigated. Work in this area generally falls into three categories: divide-and-conquer methods [20, 14] , identification code based methods [20] , and expo-nent testing methods [15, 16, 25, 14] . [8] . The authors observed that the divide-and-conquer method they studied outperformed verifying each signature individually when w/N < .15 in batches of 1024 BLS signatures using 160-bit MNT curves.
Divide-and-Conquer Methods
In [14] a more efficient divide-and-conquer method called Binary Quick Search (BQS) was presented; BQS is applicable to small exponents test based verifiers. In this method a batch verifier that compares two quantities, X and Y , is replaced with an equivalent test A = XY −1 , and the batch is accepted if A = 1. 2 The BQS algorithm is always 3 more efficient than any d = 2 n ary DC Verifier; When it is necessary to verify the d th child sub-batch, in BQS the sub-batch can be verified by simply computing a single inverse operation and a single multiterm multiplication (or d − 1 ordinary multiplications) rather than the much more expensive batch verification required by the Fast DC verifier. The upper bound of the number of batch verifications required by BQS is half that of the Fast DC Verifier for d = 2 [14] .
Identification Code based Methods
Pastuszak et al. [20] investigated using a Hamming identification code and a two-layer Hamming identification code for identifying invalid signatures in generic batch verification. The Hamming code verifier can identify a single error in a batch of size 2 n − 1 using n + 2 batch verifications, and the two-layer verifier can identify 2 invalid signatures in a batch of 2 n − 2 signatures using 3n + 3 batch verifications. 
Exponent Testing Methods
The first exponent testing method, developed by Lee et al. [15] , was capable of finding a single invalid signature within a batch of "DSA-type" signatures.
Signatures of this type have verification equations of the form "g m = s mod p" where m is the message, s is the signature, the generator g has order q, and p and q are primes where q | (p−1).
To identity an invalid signature, compute
and test whether Y = X z for z ∈ [1, N] . The Exponentiation method of Law and Matt [14] , for the special case of identifying a single invalid signature, is similar to the above method. Lee et al. [16] applied their approach for DSA-type signatures to identifying a single invalid signature in batches of RSA signatures. They addressed the problem of identifying multiple invalid RSA signatures by using their RSA method in a divide-and-conquer method that is somewhat similar to the Single Pruning Search we present in Section 4. However, Stanek showed in [25] that their approach for RSA signatures is not secure.
In [14] two exponent testing methods for pairing-based batch signatures, the Exponentiation method and the Exponentiation with Sectors method, were presented. Both methods require computing a number of batch verifications that are proportional to the number of invalid signatures w in the batch. The Exponentiation method requires w + 1 verifications (including the initial batch verification) and the same number of product of pairings computations. Exponentiation with Sectors requires at most 2w + 1 product of pairings computations. Both methods use exhaustive search during batch verification, resulting in exponential cost.
Exponentiation Method. For the Cha-Cheon signature scheme, compute α 0 and test whether α 0 is equal to the identity. If so, the batch is valid. Otherwise compute α j , w ≥ j ≥ 1,
and perform a test on the values
0 has a solution for 1 ≤ z 1 ≤ N using Shanks' giant-step baby-step algorithm [24] . If successful, w = 1 and z 1 is the position of the invalid signature. In general the method tests whether
has a solution where p t is the tth elementary symmetric polynomial in
The authors show that the tests can be performed in O( 
An Alternate Approach to Divide-and-Conquer Methods
Divide-and-conquer methods can be viewed as operating on (for simplicity) a binary tree T with w ≥ 1 invalid signatures whose root node, root T , is the batch, and each pair of child nodes represents the two nearly equal size sub-batches of their parent. Previously published methods such as Binary DC Verifier and BQS identify the invalid signatures within the initial batch by descending through the tree, performing verifications on the sub-batches of the nodes they encounter. When one of the methods reaches a node whose sub-batch is valid, the methods do not visit its descendants, if any. The methods identify the invalid signatures by identifying those nodes that are either the ancestors of the leaf nodes of T that represent invalid signatures, or the leaf nodes themselves. The difference between the published methods are 1) the degree of the tree and 2) how efficiently the nodes of the tree are verified.
The methods we propose view T as consisting of a parent sub-tree P T with root node root P T = root T , and the leaves of P T are the roots of the w maximal sub-trees ST i , i = 1, .., w, of T which represent sub-batches that have a single invalid signature. If the w = 1, then T = ST 1 and P T is the node root T . The new methods identify invalid signatures by descending through P T and identifying its leaves, and concurrently identifying the single invalid signature in each of the sub-batches these leaves represent.
For signature schemes such as the Cha-Cheon, node of T is the root of some ST i if there exists a value z, lb ≤ z ≤ ub, that is a solution to α 1,node = α z 0,node . The values lb and ub are the lower and upper bounds of the sub-batch represented by node within B, and
Shanks' giant-step baby-step algorithm can determine if such a solution exists in time (multiplications in F q d ) proportional to the square root of the size of the sub-batch. If no solution is found, then node is in P T but is not a leaf; hence its children must be tested. We refer to this approach as single pruning.
When the children of an interior node p in P T , l and its sibling r, are leaves of P T , there exist values z l in the range of indexes of the signatures in the left sub-batch and z r in the range of signatures in the right sub-batch, such that α 1,p = α
The values z l and z r can be determined using an algorithm, P airSolver(Lef t, Right), with cost proportional to the size of the (sub-)batch represented by p, see Appendix A.1. If the algorithm fails, then at least one of the child nodes is not a leaf of P T and they are tested individually using Shanks' algorithm. We refer to this approach as paired single pruning.
Single Pruning Search (SPS) Method.
The recursive algorithm below describes the Single Pruning Search (SPS) method on a batch B which is a list of N = 2 h , h ≥ 1, randomly ordered message / signature pairs ((
where the signature components for Cha-Cheon are verified elements of G 1 . On the initial call to SP S(X, α 0,P , α 1,P ), X = B, α 0,P = 1, α 1,P = 1. SPS uses the following algorithms: Algorithm SP S(X, α 0,P , α 1,P ) (Single Pruning Search) Input: X a list of message / signature pairs, α0,P and α1,P in GT . Output: A list of the invalid pairs in the batch.
// Since α0 of B is not equal to 1, compute and store α Shanks(B) failed, compute and store α
Get 0 (X) computes products of pairings only for the root node and left children nodes that are tested by SPS. Get 1 (X) only computes products of pairings for the root and for each left child X tested by SPS when the α 0 of X is not equal to α 0 of the parent of X.
Paired Single Pruning Search Method
The recursive algorithm below describes the Paired Single Pruning Search (PSPS) method on a batch B, which is a list of N = 2 h , h ≥ 1, randomly ordered message / signature pairs ((m 1 , s 1 ), . . . , (m N , s N ) ) where the signature components for Cha-Cheon are verified elements of G 1 . On the initial call to P SP S(X, α 0,P , α 1,P ), X = B, α 0,P = 1, α 1,P = 1.
Algorithm P SP S(X, α 0,P , α 1,P ) (Paired Single Pruning Search) Input: X a list of message / signature pairs, α0,P and α1,P in GT . Output: A list of the invalid pairs in the batch. Return: A boolean. If w ≥ 2, the average cost of SPS is the sum of the costs of computing α 0 , α
1 , plus the sum of the costs generated as SPS investigates the descendents of root T .
The following recurrence relation generates these costs:
, w = 2 and M > 2;
where for Cha-Cheon:
For C (S) (2, 0, M/2) and C (S) (w, 0, M/2), Get 0 (X) is called for the left child node and no inverse is computed, with cost CstDblPair. For C (S) (1, 1, M/2), both Get 0 (X) and Get 1 (X) are called for the left child, combined cost is 2 CstDblPair + 2 CstInvG T ; for the right child, cost is zero, and two successful calls are made to Shanks(X) with combined cost of 8 3 M/2 CstMultG T . C (S) (w − 1, 1, M/2) is similar to C (S) (1, 1, M/2) except that one of the calls to Shanks(X) fails to find a solution. Both calls to Shanks(X) fail for C (S) (w − i, i, M/2).
Paired Single Pruning Search Performance
If w ≤ 1, PSPS has the same average cost as SPS. If w ≥ 2, the average cost of PSPS is the sum of the costs of computing α 0 , α
1 , the cost of the failed Shanks test on the batch B, and the sum of the costs generated as PSPS investigates the descendants of root T . The following recurrence relation generates these costs:
For C (P) (2, 0, M/2) and C (P) (w, 0, M/2), Get 0 (X) is called for the left child node and no inverse is computed. For C (P) (1, 1, M/2), Get 0 (X) is called for the left child, the cost is CstDblPair + CstInvG T , and a successful call is made to P airSolver(Lef t, Right) with expected cost of M/2 CstMultG T . For the argument C (P) (w − 1, 1, M/2), both Get 0 (X) and Get 1 (X) are called for both the left and right child, one failed call is made to P airSolver(Lef t, Right) with cost M CstMultG T , and one successful and one failed call are made to Shanks(X).
is similar to C (P) (w − 1, 1, M/2) except that both calls to Shanks(X) fail.
Number of Product of Pairings Computations of SPS and PSPS
Let T be a perfect binary tree, and PT (2) be the sub-tree of P T , where each node represents 2 or more invalid signatures. For each node in PT (2) , SPS computes an α 0 for its left child, unless the child is a leaf node of T . For each node in the PT (2) with both child nodes in P T , SPS also computes α 1 for its left child, unless the child is a leaf node of T . This computation occurs w − 1 times. SPS also computes a pair of αs for the root. Therefore, including the initial batch verification, SPS requires | PT (2) | + (w + 1) product of pairings computations, if none of the leaf nodes of P T are leaves of T . SPS requires two fewer α computations whenever a pair of leaves of P T are leaves of T . For a perfect binary tree, the number of ways j pairs leaves of P T can be leaves of T is In Appendix C we show that | PT (2) | < 2w − 1; therefore the expected number of product of pairings computations required by SPS is less than 3w. Since the number of product of pairings computations in the cost functions of PSPS are all less than or equal to the corresponding functions of SPS , the average number of product of pairings used by PSPS is also O(w). Figure 1 and Figure 2 compare methods analyzed in Section 5.1 and Appendix B for finding invalid signatures in a batch once the initial batch verification has failed for Cases A and C of [12] . In Case A, the group order r is a 160-bit value, the elliptic curve E is defined over F q , where q is a 160-bit value, and the embedding degree d = 6. In Case C, the group order r is a 256-bit value, q is a 256-bit value, and the embedding degree d = 12. All costs are given in terms of the number of multiplications (m) in F q , assuming that squaring has the same cost as multiplication, using the following estimates from Granger, Page and Smart [12] , and Granger and Smart [13] .
Number of Multiplications in F q
-For Case A, 1 double product of pairings = 16, 355m, 1 multiplication in F q 6 = 15m, 1 inverse in F q 6 = 44m (assuming 1 inverse in F q = 10m), and 1 elliptic curve addition = 11m. -For Case C, 1 double product of pairings = 62, 797m, 1 multiplication in F q 12 = 45m, 1 inverse in F q 12 = 104m, and 1 elliptic curve addition = 11m. 
Conclusion
We have presented two new methods, Single Pruning Search and Paired Single Pruning Search, for identifying invalid signatures in pairing-based batch signature schemes using the small exponents test, and have analyzed their average case performance. These new methods require O(w) product of pairings computations and O(w √ N ) and O(wN ) number of multiplications in F q d . The methods are described for Cha-Cheon signatures, but are applicable to other batch verified signature schemes such as the batch verifiers presented in [8] .
These new methods, like BQS and earlier divide-and-conquer methods, can be used when there is uncertainty in the number of invalid signatures in a batch. As shown in the figures in Section 5.3, the new methods significantly outperform the Binary Quick Search method when w N , and perform as well as or better than the exponentiation methods except when N and w are small. Unlike the exponentiation methods, with the new methods a batch verifier is not forced to switch methods when tests for small w fail.
In [14] the authors suggested that the exponentiation methods can be used with BQS to provide improved performance after tests for small values of w fail. While this is certainly true, the result can be expensive. Ideally, we would have a single efficient method for finding the invalid signatures in a batch that always has the lowest expected cost no matter how many signatures are invalid. Such a method would be especially useful when an adversary is occasionally able to inject bursts of several invalid signatures into some batches. Short of that ideal, but a practical alternative, would be a small set of methods, each of which for some range of batch sizes of interest always provides the lowest expected cost. Currently the Paired Single Pruning Search, provides the lowest expected cost when the batch size is in the range 128 to 512. For batches larger than 512, we would expect batch verifiers to utilize the bucket test for Cha-Cheon and related signature schemes rather than the small exponents test. Finding such a minimal cost method for batches smaller than 128 is as an open problem. Another open problem is to find more efficient methods than the generic DC verifiers of [20] for identifying the invalid signatures in a batch when an initial bucket test verifier fails.
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A Auxiliary Algorithms for SPS and PSPS
The algorithms in Section 4 for the SPS and PSPS methods call Get 0 (X) to obtain α 0 (and α −1 0 ) for X, and Get 1 (X) to obtain α 1 (and α −1 1 ) for X. In this section we describe these algorithms for Cha-Cheon signatures. Get 0 (X) and Get 1 (X) use the following algorithms: 
When X is a left child, the cost is at most 2 · CstSubG 1 + CstDblPair + CstInvG T . If X is a right child, the cost is at most 2 CstMultG T . Since CstDblPair CstSubG 1 and CstDblPair CstMultG T , we estimate the cost of Get 0 for the siblings as CstDblPair + CstInvG T in Section 5. 
Algorithm
To compute α 1 and its inverse for a left child costs no more than 4 · CstAddG 1 + 2 · CstSubG 1 + 2 · CstMultG 1 (t 1 ) + CstInvG T + CstDblPair with t 1 = log 2 (Len(X)) < log 2 (N ) . If X is a right child, the cost is at most 2 CstMultG T . We estimate the cost of Get 1 for the pair of siblings as CstDblPair + CstInvG T in Section 5. 4
A.1 Testing functions for SPS and PSPS Algorithm Shanks(X) (Test whether there is a single invalid signature in X)
Input: X a list of message / signature pairs. Output: None. Return: The index in B of the invalid signature or 0
The algorithm Shanks(X) shown above tests whether the equation α 1,n = α z 0,n has a solution z in the range of l up to u, the bounds of the (sub-)batch X within the original batch. If X has a single invalid signature the algorithm returns the position of the invalid signature, otherwise the algorithm returns 0. The algorithm checks for a solution of When there is single invalid signature in X the average cost of the algorithm is at most 2 CstExptG T (t 1 ), 5 and mShank(m) multiplications in G T where m = u − l + 1. When t = s, i.e., when M is a square number
The approximation mShank(m) = When there is single invalid signature in both Lef t and Right the average cost of the algorithm is at most 2 CstExptG T (t 1 ), 6 plus s CstMultG T . When lowerindex(Lef t) = 1 only one exponentiation is required. Otherwise the cost is at most 2 CstExptG T (t 1 ) and 2s CstMultG T . Since CstDblPair >> CstExptG T (t 1 ), in Section 5 we use s CstMultG T as the cost of a successful call and as 2s CstMultG T for a failed call.
B Expected Costs of Earlier Methods

B.1 Binary Quick Search
The Binary Quick Search Method can compute the can compute the values
for Cha-Cheon signatures by using the following algorithm (assuming N = 2 h ).
For Cha-Cheon signatures the cost to compute α 0 is the sum of 1) the cost to compute the B i s and D i s which is N · CstDlbMultG 1 (t 1 , t 2 ) +N · CstMultG 1 (t 1 ) with t 1 = log 2 (r)/2 and t 2 = log 2 (r) , 2) the cost of the algorithm above, 2(N − 1) CstAddG 1 , and 3) a double product of pairings computation. If w ≥ 1 the average cost of BQS is increased by the sum of the costs generated as BQS investigates the descendants of root T . The following recurrence relation generates these costs.
where for Cha-Cheon C (B) (l) = CstDblPair and C (B) (b) = CstDblPair + CstInvG T .
B.2 Exponentiation Method
The algorithms used to compute the components of the Exponentiation Method are described in [14] . The authors' analysis of the algorithms focused on bounding their worse case performance when w << N. In this section we examine their average case performance after an initial batch verification has failed. When w ≥ 1 the expected additional cost is sum of the cost of each additional α j for B, 1 ≤ j ≤ w, plus the cost of the failed tests for a solution to equation (2) for 1 ≤ j < w and the expected cost of a successful test for j = w. Note that the Exponentiation Method only computes at most w inverses in
w−1 , when performing these tests.
Computing α j , j ≥ 1. The cost of computing each α j of equation (1) for j ≥ 1 is approximately CstDblPair +(2(N − 1) + j) CstAddG 1 +j CstSubG 1 plus 2j CstMultG 1 (t 1 ), where each t 1 = log 2 (k) for 1 ≤ k ≤ j, plus an additional 2j CstMultG 1 (t 1 ), t 1 = log 2 (s j,k ) where each s j,k for 1 ≤ k ≤ j is a Stirling number of the second kind. However, since the exponentiation methods are only useful for very small w and both the ks and the Stirling numbers are very small when w is small, we approximate this cost by CstDblPair +2N CstAddG 1 in Section 5. [17] is used in [14] , it has an average cost for a successful test of about 3 2 √ N CstMultG T + CstExptG T (t 1 ) + CstInvG T where t 1 ≈ log 2 ( √ N ). Since the number of multiplications in G T used in CstExptG T (t 1 ) is small compared to (1)
